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Abstract 
 
Pregiudizi e precomprensioni indotti dalla forza delle ideologie possono incatenare il 
nostro giudizio e deformare la nostra comprensione storico-politica diventando dei 
fantasmi. Risulta difficile distinguere fra pericoli concreti ed illusioni inconsistenti. 
Partendo dallo spunto offerto dal testo di Derrida Spettri di Marx, McBride utilizza le 
riflessioni di tre grandi filosofi "esorcisti" (Marx, Sartre e Derrida), utili a depurare le 
nostre coscienze, intervallandole con istantanee storiche capaci di dare corpo al 
problema. La riflessione di Marx pur muovendosi contro gli spettri ideologici diventa a 
sua volta uno spettro. Si creano dei nuovi fantasmi, protagonisti di un meccanismo che 
replica ed amplifica il terrore e che degenera ancora di più traducendosi in diffidenza 
nei confronti dell’altro. A chiusura, l’autore sottolinea la necessità da parte degli Stati 
Uniti, segnati dalla paura del terrorismo post-11 settembre, di riformulare il loro ruolo 
nello schacchiere internazionale per ridimensionarlo. Solo così essi potranno 
fronteggiare i veri pericoli della postmodernità. 
 
 
Prejudices and preconceptions caused by the force of ideology can enchain 
our judgment and distort our historical-political comprehension becoming 
ghosts. It’s difficult to distinguish between actual dangers and 
groundlessness illusions. Starting from the inspiration provided by the 
Derrida's Specters of Marx, McBride uses the reflections of three great 
philosophers "exorcists" (Marx, Sartre and Derrida), useful to purify our 
consciences, spacing them with historical snapshots that are able to give 
shape to the problem. Marx’s philosophy while moving against idealogical 
specters becomes, in turn, an ideological spectrum. New ghosts are created, 
they are protagonists of a mechanism that replicates and amplifies the terror 
and degenerates even more translating it in suspicion of the other. At closing, 
the author underlines the need for the United States, marked by fear of 
terrorism post-September11th, to reformulate their role in international 
political scene to resize it. Only in this way they will face the real dangers of 
postmodernity. 
 
 
 
Les préjugés et les idées préconçues causés par la force de l'idéologie peut enchaîner 
notre jugement et déformer notre compréhension politique et historique en devenant 
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des spectres. Il est difficile de distinguer entre les dangers réels et les illusions 
incohérentes. À partir de l'inspiration fournie par le texte de Derrida Spettri di Marx, 
McBride utilise les réflexions de trois grands philosophes "exorcistes" (Marx, Sartre et 
Derrida), utiles pour purifier nos consciences en leur proposant des instantanés 
historiques qui soient en mesure de donner forme à ce problème. La réflexion de Marx, 
bien qu’elle aille contre les spectres idéologiques, devient à son tour un spectre. Ainsi, 
se créent de nouveaux fantômes, protagonistes d'un mécanisme qui reproduit et 
amplifie la terreur et qui dégénère encore en se traduisant par une méfiance de l’un en 
vers l'autre. En conclusion, l'auteur met l'accent sur la nécessité pour les États-Unis, 
marqués par la peur du terrorisme post-Septembre 11, de reformuler leur rôle dans 
l'échelle internationale, afin de lui redonner mesure. C'est seulement alors que les 
États-Unis pourront faire face aux dangers réels de la postmodernité. 
 
 
 
 
My title reference is above all to the book by Jacques Derrida 
entitled Spectres of Marx. Those who have read this book will remember that, 
at least in some sections, it deals almost as much with Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet as with Marx, even though its sub-title, “The State of the Debt, the 
Work of Mourning, and the New International,” implies a serious political 
purpose – and Derrida indeed had such a purpose. They may also remember 
that he recounts, at the beginning, his déjà vu experience in preparing for the 
gathering at which he first presented the core of this text, a 1993 conference 
entitled “Whither Marxism?” that was held at the University of California at 
Riverside. He had sent the organizers his title, “Spectres of Marx,” a year in 
advance and later decided that, as part of his preparation, he should go back 
to read Marx’s Communist Manifesto, which he had not read for decades. He 
says that he felt ashamed of himself when, as he began reading, he realized 
that “spectre” was the very first noun in its very first sentence: “A spectre is 
haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism.” Derrida had not remembered 
that when he had submitted his title.  
Alas, Derrida has himself become a spectre since then, as will be 
the fate of us all. I remain haunted – and this is not a mere play on words – 
by an event of November 2007, Unesco’s World Philosophy Day in Istanbul, 
at which I had the honor of being given thirty minutes in which to eulogize 
three recently deceased American philosophers, all of whom I had known 
fairly well in different capacities: Alan Gewirth, Iris Young, and Richard Rorty. 
Our Turkish hosts had hung huge photographs of the three of them above the 
dais, and those photographs were left there throughout the entire day and a 
half of meetings. Ever since then, that image constantly recurs to me. I do not 
find this upsetting, except that it reminds me of my grief over lives cut short – 
particularly Iris’s, since she was by far the youngest of the three to die – but it 
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is, there is no better English word for it, haunting. And so I think we can 
conclude that there are appropriate ways, fitting and proper, in which to be 
haunted by real spectres from the past – what Derrida called, in the middle 
phrase of his sub-title, “the work of mourning, le travail du deuil” – and to 
draw valuable lessons from them. Some of these lessons will be positive – 
here was a life well lived, a career that brought benefit to the community of 
the individual being remembered – while others will be negative. An example 
of the latter that Derrida analyzes is Marx’s account of the circumstances 
surrounding Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état of December 1851, The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in which the nephew imitated his uncle’s move 
of a half-century earlier by having himself proclaimed Emperor of France. 
(Incidentally, it is at the beginning of this masterly piece of historical criticism 
that Marx, recalling a remark by Hegel to the effect that great historical 
events occur, as it were, twice, gives us one of the most often-cited lines from 
all of his writings: “He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the 
second as farce.”) In this essay I propose to consider some ways in which, 
with occasional glances back at past history and with the help of the three 
philosophers mentioned in my title, we may better distinguish legitimate 
hauntings from illusory ones and thus become better positioned to exorcise 
the false spectres that plague and possess us today, impede our potential 
progress towards a happier, more peaceful world, and ultimately threaten to 
lead the human race, demonically, to perdition. 
I shall begin by looking a little more closely at Derrida’s encounter 
with Marx. For students of philosophy and of cultural trends in general, the 
book, Spectres of Marx, has considerable significance. For it is a clear 
confirmation, against critics who proclaim that postmodernism as a way of 
thinking is too relativistic to allow its proponents to hold any value 
commitments, that this postmodernist thinker par excellence – at least, that is 
how Derrida is generally regarded – held very strong political views, views 
over which, precisely, the spectre of Marx hovered. To be sure, Derrida was 
never anything close to being an orthodox Marxist – and as he also reminds 
us, Marx, after learning about what some of his followers in France were 
making of his philosophy, said that there was one thing certain, namely, that 
he himself was not a “Marxist”. Derrida expresses several sentiments with 
which I am in complete agreement and which help frame what I shall be 
saying here: first, that we all owe a great intellectual debt to Marx (this being 
one meaning of the first phrase of his sub-title, “the State of debt,” which also 
punningly refers to over-reaching modern governments, such as today’s 
deficit-ravaged United States); next, that neoliberalist triumphalism, best 
epitomized at the time of the book’s publication by Francis Fukuyama in his 
work proclaiming “the end of history” in the society of market capitalism, The 
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End of History and the Last Man, is at best premature and at worst 
thoroughly reprehensible; and finally, that the ghost of Marx, Marx the 
advocate of serious political change and not the mere speculative 
philosophical spirit to which some people would like to reduce him, is still very 
much with us all as a spectre – a spectre, according to Derrida’s definition at 
one point, is a spirit incarnated – and cannot be exorcised from our injustice-
filled world.  
Derrida’s book does a remarkable job of highlighting the many, 
many references to ghosts and fantasms or phantoms that are scattered 
throughout Marx’s writings – something that I do not believe any previous 
work about Marx has ever done so thoroughly. As one may imagine, Marx’s 
conscious purpose in writing about spectres was usually – in the spirit, so to 
speak, of the Enlightenment to which he was in so many ways an heir – to try 
to get rid of them, including all the illusions that he called “ideologies,” 
beginning with the central ideological claim of Hegel’s philosophy of history, 
namely, that human history is the self-realization of Spirit, the Spirit of God. 
(This idea of Hegel’s was, of course, the inspiration behind the title of 
Fukuyama’s book, although Fukuyama did not subscribe to many of the more 
metaphysical or theological aspects of Hegel’s thought.) So Marx generally 
aspired to being an exorcist, and not a defender of ghosts – although his 
fascination with his favorite author, Shakespeare, including in particular 
Hamlet, suggests that he was exceptionally well attuned and sensitive to the 
power of ghost stories. As I shall go on to try to show, that is what makes him 
especially useful in the task of political exorcism with which we are faced 
today. However, in the famous first sentence of the Communist Manifesto, 
already mentioned, it is Marx himself who conjures up the spectre, and it is a 
spectre not from the past, but from the imagined future. Let us for a moment 
consider exactly what Marx (and his colleague Friedrich Engels, because the 
document bears both their names as authors) intends by this way of 
beginning. 
In the second sentence, after the initial proclamation that the spectre 
of Communism is haunting Europe, it says that all the powers of old Europe – 
the Pope and the Czar and so on – “have entered into a holy alliance to 
exorcise this spectre.” It is then noted that it has by now – this is the year 
1848 – become a common scare tactic everywhere for those in power to 
brand opposition parties as communistic, and that from this we may draw two 
conclusions, one factual and the other practical: first, that Communism has 
itself come to be regarded as a power in its own right, and second that 
something like the present Manifesto needs to be published, stating the views 
and aims of Communists, precisely in order to “meet this nursery tale of the 
Spectre of Communism.”  
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So, we may well ask, just what are Marx and Engels saying about 
this spectre of theirs – that it is a real spectre, which should be feared, or a 
merely illusory one? In any case, what would a “real” spectre be, what would 
that mean? In order to show just how difficult this question is to answer, let 
me cite two sentences from a powerful passage in which Derrida suggests 
that the development of Leninist and later Stalinist Bolshevism out of the 
Marxist tradition, and of Naziism as, among other things, a fierce reaction to 
Bolshevism, were two opposite but in many respects similar reactions to the 
spectre that Marx had conjured up, a spectre that had eventually occasioned 
as much panic in the Marxists themselves as in their opponents: 
 
In short, the entire history of European politics at least, and at least since 
Marx, might be seen as that of a pitiless war between camps internally 
unified and equally terrorized by the phantom, the phantom of the other and 
their own phantom as phantom of the other. The Holy Alliance is terrorized 
by the phantom of Communism and wages against it a war that is still going 
on, but it is a war against a camp that is itself structured by the terror of the 
phantom, the one that it faces and the one that it bears within itself1. 
 
If there is truth to this speculation on Derrida’s part, the spectre has 
acquired a life, a certain reality, of its own that is far longer-lasting than the 
life of any human being on this earth. And that life revolves around its 
capacity to terrorize. 
Today we are again – or should I say “still”? – being terrorized, no 
longer so much by the spectre of Communism, at least not by Communism in 
the form in which Marx and Engels proceeded to spell it out in their 
broadsheet, but by other spectres which, while they are to some extent fueled 
by events and realities in the non-spectral world – the famous attack on the 
Twin Towers, for instance –, have assumed their own identities and are 
manipulating us, or at least being used to manipulate us with the connivance 
of some of our fellow human beings, along ultimately self-destructive paths 
similar to that taken by Hamlet in the play. Just as the revelations made by 
his father’s ghost propel Hamlet along a path at the end of which all the 
principal characters save one, the scholar and philosopher Horatio, lie dead, 
so we are constantly being prodded to join in a crusade against only vaguely-
identified Forces of Evil which, given the very vagueness of their identification 
and the consequently indefinite enormity of their numbers, is guaranteed not 
to end before our deaths or the deaths of our children or grandchildren, but in 
fact to be unending. This is the ultimate implication, usually left unstated, of 
the expression, “the War on Terror.” Hence once again, to recall Derrida’s 
words, we, the Holy Alliance which now goes, or at least went for a short 
time, by the name of “the Coalition of the Willing,” are being terrorized by the 
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phantom of the other and our own phantom as phantom of the other, by the 
phantom that we face and the phantom that we bear within ourselves.        
It would obviously be better for us not to be terrorized in this way. If 
it is true, as Aristotle said and I believe, that the purpose of both individual 
and communal life is eudaimonia, happiness and well-being, then to live in 
perpetual terror is to fall far short of our human potential. So, how can some 
of the philosophical perspectives of the three individuals whom I have singled 
out in the title of this essay – Marx, Sartre, and Derrida –  be of assistance in 
rescuing us from this reign of terror that is to such a considerable degree, as I 
believe it is and as the theme of this lecture series also appears to assume, 
self-imposed?   
First Marx. I have already referred briefly to, but would now like to 
elaborate on,  two types of illusions that he has called to our attention and 
that continue to be instructive. One of them, which is illustrated by the 
phrase, “the spectre of Communism,” is the illusion that those who adhere to 
a certain set of ideas and/or practices that are unfamiliar to us and that 
include elements in conflict with our own prior beliefs are therefore 
necessarily totally alien and hostile and must be fought, as it were, to the 
death. I do not wish to declare absolutely that no such sets of incorrigibly 
hostile ideas have ever existed. Hitler’s Naziism is a good candidate for such 
an exception, although before asserting categorically that it is such we would 
first need to explore just how and why it managed nevertheless to attract so 
many ordinary Germans, along with many German philosophers in addition to 
Martin Heidegger, some of whom no doubt initially brushed aside Hitler’s 
virulent anti-Semitism as a relatively unimportant, maybe even slightly 
embarrassing, part of a generally upbeat doctrine of national renewal. But I 
do not have the space to undertake such considerations here. What I want to 
emphasize is that the tendency to demonize whole classes of people and the 
ideas associated with them as alien “others” to be despised and if possible 
obliterated – “the Jews”, “Islamic Fundamentalists”, “illegals”, even “feminists” 
and “liberals” for those who identify themselves as the so-called “Right”, and, 
of course, “terrorists” for almost all “right-thinking” people in the West, just like 
“the Communists” from Marx’s time until the recent past – is extremely strong 
among us today. But in fact it is the demonizers’ own demons that are in 
desperate need of exorcism. The fact that, for example, a prominent 
Presidential candidate (Senator McCain) in the country which some Iranians 
have called “the Great Satan” could sing a lighthearted song suggesting that 
it would be desirable just to “bomb Iran” demonstrates very well the 
pervasiveness of the type of illusion to which I am referring. A proud and 
complex people, with many conflicting internal factions, still traumatized from 
a war in which they were attacked by a neighboring country’s dictator named 
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Saddam Hussein who was at the time encouraged rather than discouraged 
from this aggression by the United States government, is thus reduced to the 
status of a kind of unreality, or rather to the quasi-reality of a spectre, which it 
then becomes permissible to contemplate devastating. To me an even more 
shocking example of such spectral thinking, shocking because at least at one 
point quite recently it was being taken very seriously by many thinkers and 
even diplomats worldwide, is Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations, 
which in its rigidity and stereotyping of different cultures represents a 
reversion to a pre-Rudyard Kipling worldview.  
Now it is only fair, especially since I have just introduced the name 
of the great bard of British Imperialism, for me to mention in passing that 
Marx himself, however helpful he is in getting us to see what is going on 
when we begin imagining terrifying spectres and allowing our behavior to be 
guided by these illusions, was far from free of this type of practice. One might 
think that I am referring here to his attitude toward the bourgeoisie, but that 
aspect of his thinking is in fact much more complex. He makes it clear in one 
famous text, for example, that he regards the capitalist and the landlord as 
themselves enmeshed as much as ordinary workers in a system in which 
they cannot fail to play their assigned exploitative roles without coming to 
ruin, however much some of them might subjectively aspire to being 
philanthropic. Rather, I am referring to Marx’s often very condescending and 
dismissive remarks about the inhabitants of the sub-continent of India, 
Kipling’s own focal point of attention. It was the Indians who played the role of 
alien others for Marx, at least in some of his texts. 
My reference to the existing capitalist system that was the object of 
Marx’s lifelong critique brings me to the second type of exorcism for which I 
believe Marx is still extremely useful to us, namely, in trying to exorcise the 
Hegelian-Fukuyaman illusion that we have attained the end of history with 
our present dominant form of socioeconomic structure – in other words, the 
illusion that global free market capitalism is unsurpassable and, from the 
standpoint of human welfare, unexcelled.  
Do I have to remind any reader, I wonder, of one of the all-time 
great spectres of Western literature, Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand”? This is 
supposed, of course, to be the Hand of God, but it is a God Who encourages 
above all the pursuit of private self-interest, of systematic selfish 
acquisitiveness, because, Providentially, the free market has the innate 
power to make everything turn out for the best. Adam Smith himself had a 
much more complex view of the world than this metaphor taken in isolation 
implies; in fact his serious concerns about the parlous condition of the 
workers who are the ultimate creators of economic value were central to the 
development of Marx’s own economic thinking, which can rightly be seen as 
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a kind of extended internal critique of Smith’s conceptual framework. But the 
idea that the efficient pursuit of profit by the owners of capital is the most 
desirable basis for organizing social life and should be regarded as the 
supreme human value, at least on this earth, has come to be considered an 
unassailable dogma, more inflexible than the teachings of any church, by 
government officials, media commentators, and even intellectuals in many 
parts of the world, above all in the United States and Western Europe. 
“Privatization” – a word that only a few decades ago still had a primarily 
negative or at best neutral connotation in English-language dictionaries – has 
come to be regarded, to recall the late Richard Rorty’s famous, or infamous, 
words about the market economy, as “the Great Good Thing.” Now, I can well 
understand arguments to the effect that Marx’s call, in The Communist 
Manifesto itself, for the abolition of the private ownership of all large-scale 
means of production – factories and so on – is simply too sweeping, too 
broad, since private initiative can and sometimes does produce outcomes 
favorable to the common good. But it seems to me that the broad, sweeping 
opposite point of view that I have just been describing, which has underlain 
so many recent government policies (in many countries) favoring private 
interests over the long-term good even of the earth’s very ecosystem, can be 
explained only through some kind of deep mechanism of haunting, whereby a 
mere illusion is treated as if it were not just a private interest-friendly ghost, 
but an absolute truth. And so we can still benefit, and benefit ever anew, from 
Marx’s constant reminder that free market capitalism is not the highest 
conceivable stage of human evolution, and that we need to exorcise the 
illusion that it is. Perhaps the present period of economic downturn and 
uncertainty may be an opportune time to begin to do so again. 
There is much more that could be said about the continuing 
usefulness of Marx as a ghost-buster, but I do not wish to slight the other two 
philosophers whose names appear in the title of my paper, particularly Sartre, 
about whom I have as yet said nothing. In any case both Derrida and he were 
themselves influenced in the development of their thought, during some 
periods more than during others, by certain insights drawn from Marxian 
critical theory; it is hard for anyone concerned with sociopolitical issues today 
not to be so, even if the influence is only sub-conscious. There was a point in 
his career at which Sartre’s principal intellectual goal was to conjoin his 
earlier existentialism with Marxism, when he chided the so-called “orthodox,” 
Communist Party-based form of Marxism for having stagnated and for 
neglecting the concerns of the human individual and downplaying the reality 
of human freedom, but nevertheless regarded Marxism as the philosophy of 
his time. Near the very end of his life, it is true, he distanced himself more 
from Marx again; this was an interesting development that I have to forgo 
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discussing so that I can focus instead on Sartre’s own talents as a political 
exorcist. From among the numerous possible illustrations of these talents, I 
have chosen three, the first of which has to do with real versus illusory 
freedom, the second with Manichaeism, and the third with the taking of oaths.  
Freedom as a concept and a reality, in its many dimensions, 
abounds throughout Sartre’s philosophy, early and late. Here, I want to 
concentrate on its political dimension. Both Sartre and his almost lifelong 
partner, Simone de Beauvoir, repeatedly argued that we, humanity as a 
whole, could never be fully free, in the sociopolitical as opposed to the 
ontological sense, until everyone the world over was free, and that 
incantations about freedom in the mouths of Western political leaders who at 
the same time strongly defend structures of dominance and subordination, 
structures of exploitation, are simply hypocritical – in other words, pure 
illusions. Some of Sartre’s most forceful language describing this 
phenomenon occurs in the Preface that he wrote to Franz Fanon’s diatribe 
against colonialism, The Wretched of the Earth. That Preface begins with the 
words, “Not so long ago, the earth contained two billion inhabitants, perhaps 
five hundred million men and one billion five hundred million natives.  The 
former dispensed the Word; the others borrowed it.”2 He goes on to say that 
in every colony a small elite was selected, sent briefly to Paris, London, or 
Amsterdam to have their heads filled with empty slogans, such as “Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity,” that were irrelevant to the lives of their fellow 
colonial natives, and then sent back to their homes in Africa or Asia to repeat 
those slogans to their brethren under the illusion that these ideals really 
applied to them. Later generations of natives, such as Fanon himself, began 
to see through this trickery, and thus began the uprisings that the French and 
other colonial powers tried to put down through intimidation, military force, 
torture, and other forms of terror. But this would ultimately prove to have 
been in vain, and eventually, Sartre predicts, the past violence inflicted will 
turn around and begin to explode in the homelands. He wrote that essay in 
1961, when France was still attempting to keep control over Algeria, where 
Fanon was then living.  
Sartre was also among the French intellectuals who courageously 
condemned, at the risk of seriously negative consequences to himself, the 
French government’s effort to keep its colony in Indochina. And then came 
the turn of the United States, taking up where the French had left off, its 
government insisting that it was defending freedom through its enormously 
costly and destructive war in Vietnam. Sartre of course saw this as an 
illusion, as did so many others all over the rest of the world, and as did, 
increasingly, so many Americans as well. His biting essays on the topic and 
his eventual participation in Bertrand Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal testify to 
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his ongoing concern, which stemmed from a deep respect for the real 
freedom and humanity of those people who were being subjected to such 
military violence, so many casualties and deaths. Has the lesson yet been 
learned that it is an illusion to try to impose one’s own political and economic 
structures on others under the pretense, half believed, half bad faith, that by 
doing so one is giving them liberty (if not also equality and fraternity)? I think 
not, at least not nearly well enough. The very real spectre of Vietnam still 
hovers over us. 
On the topic of Manichaeism in Sartre’s philosophy I can be brief, 
because in a sense I have already discussed it when speaking of Marx. I 
thought it convenient, when analyzing some implications of Marx’s reference 
to “the Spectre of Communism,” to draw larger inferences which I found 
implicit in that reference; but it is Sartre who actually spells out, at length and 
in a number of texts, some of the mechanisms whereby illusory evil spectres 
are created. One of the best-known of these texts is his short book, Anti-
Semite and Jew, in which he argues that it is the anti-Semite who creates a 
supposed essence of Jewishness that he can then hate, along with all the 
Jews who incarnate that essence. Manichaeism was, of course, a Christian 
heresy based on the idea that a real essence of evil, incarnated in an evil 
deity that is almost as powerful as God Himself, actually exists. In his work on 
Genet, the playwright, Sartre shows how Genet accepted the label of himself 
as a thief, given to him when he was still a child, and lived out his early life 
thinking that he was essentially evil. In a few pages of his long Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, Sartre offers a fascinating analysis of the so-called “Great 
Fear,” a panic that swept parts of the French countryside in 1789 and was 
based on the belief that evil terrorist “brigands,” as they were called, 
sometimes said to be in an implausible alliance with the aristocracy, were 
threatening to annihilate the peasantry. And in some of his later works, 
including the Critique and the brief Preface to Fanon’s work that I have cited, 
Sartre analyzes racist ideologies held by European colonists toward the 
“natives” that resulted in identifying the latter as the hated “other.”  
This is not to say, of course, that Sartre refused to believe that there 
is much actual evil-doing in the world and therefore did not take evil seriously; 
quite to the contrary, as anyone familiar with his writing knows. As he saw 
very well, one of the frequent accompaniments of the Manichaean worldview 
that creates the false spectre of essential evil and locates it in an “alien” 
group is the hypocritical failure to see the defects in oneself and those whom 
one considers one’s peers, a refusal to admit that they are capable of doing 
evil or that one is capable of it onseself, especially if the evil deed is to be 
performed on one of the aliens. We have only to consider current polls and 
even some recent official government documents that reflect a widespread 
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acceptance, within the United States, of the notion that it is all right to torture 
and otherwise abuse members of an “evil” group, most often those labelled 
“terrorists,” because they have supposedly placed themselves outside the 
bounds of human society and become demonic. In 2008, a bill passed by the 
United States Congress to stipulate the impermissibility of certain types of 
interrogation techniques was vetoed by the Chief Executive. This, as it seems 
to me, is not only a terrible self-deception but also a step on the road to 
national self-debasement. 
Finally, speaking of terrorists, I have indicated that I want to discuss 
Sartre’s contribution to the exorcising of some of our spectres through his 
analysis of oath-taking. This requires some initial explanation. I am not 
referring to oaths of the type taken in courts to tell the truth, etc., but rather to 
oaths in the sense of “pledges,” which is the term for Sartre’s French word for 
it, serment, in the official English translation of the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason. But “oath” is, I think, a better translation of “serment” in this context, 
since the one historical example of it of which Sartre was thinking the most 
was what our history books call the “Tennis Court Oath” taken by the 
Deputies in the early stages of the French Revolution. Moreover, “oath” 
includes some reference to the supra-sensible, bordering on the magical, 
which “pledge” does not, at least not to the same extent. In any event, what 
Sartre’s analysis of this phenomenon is meant to show is the means by which 
groups that have enjoyed some initial success in a new joint project and feel 
the need to begin to organize for the long term and achieve a measure of 
stability agree to take an oath. To me, this is somewhat reminiscent of 
Hamlet’s father’s ghost when he keeps saying “Swear” to Horatio and 
Marcellus to ensure that they will never speak to others of what they have 
seen and heard in Hamlet’s company. The term Sartre uses to characterize 
the atmosphere of such oaths, or pledges, has been controversial, but I find it 
quite apt: it is “fraternity-terror.” The idea of the oath is that it binds us in a 
new way, as brothers (or sisters, of course, although “sororité” is not 
recognized as a word in the French language), but that it also imposes a new 
threat which we mutually accept: to wit, that if any of us breaks the spirit of 
this oath and turns traitor, then he or she becomes liable to be the object of 
the group’s terror. In much of his analysis of various possible stages of group 
formation and disintegration, to none of which Sartre assigns any necessary 
sequence, he writes as a mere observer, refraining from value judgments. He 
himself does not explicitly identify the taking of the oath as an example of 
spectre-creation. But I think that it can be seen in that way, and as such it 
helps explain what I consider one of the greatest and most threatening of all 
spectres in modern times, the spectre of the nation and the spectre of 
unquestioning patriotism that is its subjective counterpart. For there are 
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many, both in the United States and in numerous other countries, who 
consider their country, meaning always their particular conception of that 
country, to be a sacred entity, so that any disloyalty towards it, which of 
course means whatever they themselves regard as constituting disloyalty 
towards it, merits a charge of treason and the consequences that flow from 
such a charge. One is expected to “pledge allegiance,” to swear, not merely 
to a flag, but also to the nation symbolized by the flag, a nation which, a priori 
and by definition, bestows liberty and justice on all. 
But what if, in the real world as distinct from this pure ideal, in 
specific instances the government of that country does not appear to be 
promoting liberty and justice for all? True believers in the spectre of the 
nation would say that this is somehow impossible, that of course errors may 
occur, but that the nation’s cause is just, and that its leaders are ipso facto 
committed to furthering that cause, sometimes even despite themselves. And 
so they brand strong critics of national policies as potential, if not actual, 
“terrorists,” to be excluded from the national “fraternity.” In fact, it seems 
especially paradoxical – a paradox that a number of other observers have 
noted – that there has been a revival of nationalism in various parts of the 
world at the very time at which the large forces of what is commonly called 
“globalization” are eating away at the whole previous structure of a world of 
national sovereignties. In this increasingly interrelated world, the most 
dangerous imaginable of nationalist obsessions would be, by definition, one 
that would come to afflict citizens and especially government officials of the 
most powerful, at least the most militarily powerful, country in the world. Alas, 
de nobis fabula narratur – it is about us that the tale is told. 
In seeking to combat this last-mentioned obsession and to see more 
clearly and realistically, we may now take leave of Sartre and return, not so 
much to Derrida’s text, but to one of its underlying ideas, namely the idea that 
lies behind the third and final part of his book’s sub-title, “the new 
International.” Of course, the old Internationals – there was a succession of 
them – were associated with the Marxist tradition. But Derrida’s reference 
here is to the new importance, in this new age into which we have entered, of 
international law. He connects this idea with another one, frequently cited by 
his admirers, that he labels “la démocratie à venir” – the democracy to come, 
or the future democracy. This is meant not to be a spectre, but a hope. It is 
vague and ill-defined, necessarily so because it cannot be imposed by 
anyone, yet it has considerable appeal.        
Although Derrida’s legacy includes other writings, in addition to 
Spectres of Marx, in which he deals with politically-relevant issues – for 
instance, his book about Europe entitled The Other Heading (L’Autre cap) – I 
prefer to conclude this essay from a more predominantly American and even 
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personal perspective. The United States, despite its relatively brief national 
history, is already cluttered with spectres from its past: on the one hand, 
terrifying spectres, such as the ghosts of the Indian peoples driven from their 
lands and decimated, or the ghosts of the slave ships and their cargo in the 
Middle Passage; on the other hand, the old, often inspiring, but never fully 
realized ideals of “Manifest Destiny,” “the City Set on a Hill,” the “novus ordo 
seclorum,” which still appears on the Great Seal on our one dollar bills, and 
so on. Most if not all of these salient ideals bespeak in various ways a strong 
sense of one big idea: American exceptionalism, as it has so often been  
called. One of the reasons why the attack on the Twin Towers was utilized to 
create a climate of fear, the fear of unending terrorism to which I alluded 
earlier, was that, for many, an important aspect of our alleged exceptionalism 
had been the illusion that American territory was immune to attack by foreign 
forces. Like all illusions, of course, this one was without solid factual basis 
(one need only recall Pearl Harbor, as many in fact did in September 2001), 
but its abrupt and brutal shattering, in many citizens’ minds, certainly 
facilitated the transition from the fear of the dying spectre of Communism to 
that of global terrorism. On the basis of the survey that I have offered of 
certain ideas from my three authors and my commentaries on these ideas, 
then, let me now propose a brief list of practical steps that could be taken, 
beginning now, to stimulate among ourselves and our fellow citizens a 
healthier, less fearful, less obsessive climate, in which we might begin once 
again to imagine a more hopeful possible future.      
First, the United States must rejoin the world of nations, at this time 
when nationhood itself is, objectively speaking, rapidly diminishing in 
importance despite the small but often deadly counter-currents that have 
recently been observed in certain regions such as the Balkans. What I mean 
by “rejoining the world of nations”  is, above all, reversing the practice of 
selectively interpreting international law by stressing it when it is thought to 
be to the special advantage of the United States and rejecting it when 
government leaders deem it disadvantageous, as when the Geneva 
Conventions have been drastically reinterpreted and in fact disregarded, 
decisions of the International Court of Justice in The Hague that are not to 
our leaders’ liking have been simply flouted – I am thinking of the case of the 
mining of Managua harbor and the Court’s holding that the United States had 
been in violation of international law –, and treaties signed in good faith, such 
as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are treated like worthless scraps of 
paper. I also mean that other treaties and agreements such as the one 
banning landmines and the one endorsing the new international court and the 
one promoting global warming, with respect to all of which the United States 
remains among the few holdouts in the world, should be signed in good faith. 
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I also mean that the dangerous, deliberately provocative policy of announcing 
that this country feels free to engage in pre-emptive attacks on any country 
that our leaders regard as even potential future threats must be rescinded. In 
these and in many other ways American exceptionalism in recent years has 
come to be seen in many, probably most, parts of the world as real and really 
threatening – no longer the exceptionalism of the city set on a hill, but the 
exceptionalism of a rogue state which, unlike those entities to which our State 
Department has attached this label in recent years, is really powerful and 
potentially capable of doing enormous damage. 
Second, as a corollary to the first, we must take stock of just who we 
are, where we stand, objectively speaking, in the world today, whatever our 
standing even in the recent past may have been. We are no longer the center 
of global production in most industries. The formerly “almighty dollar” has 
declined by an extraordinary amount relative to other currencies. Although we 
still have outstanding institutions of higher education, tests of average 
intellectual acumen and knowledge in our population as a whole consistently 
produce embarrassing results as compared with a number of other countries. 
Although residents of the United States constitute roughly 5% of the world’s 
population, we consume roughly 25% of the world’s energy and have almost 
the same percentage of the world’s prison population, in which it was recently 
reported that the United States’ numbers are not only relatively, but now also 
absolutely, the highest in the world. And of course our annual military 
expenditures constitute, depending on just which estimates one accepts, 
either a little less or, more likely in my opinion, somewhat more than 50% of 
annual global military expenditures. Of course one could find other areas of 
national life about which it would be possible to be more positive, and of 
course, too, there are those – remember the short-lived fad of conjuring up 
the ghost of Imperial Rome that sprang up in the early years of the Iraq 
episode – who would like to think of the United States as aiming above all to 
be, to cite Vergil’s Aeneid, “populus bello superbus”5, a people outstanding in 
war. But these aspects of our current national life that I have just mentioned, 
which are to me highly problematic – and there are several others that seem 
equally problematic that I have refrained from mentioning – are serious and 
central, and they need to be faced, not in the spirit of criticism for criticism’s 
sake, but rather in the spirit of what I have called “taking stock” – being 
honest with ourselves about who we are. It is, in short, time to abandon 
sloganizing and cheerleading. 
Third, we need to work to restore a sense of decency, of civility, to 
our public discourse, which is now so filled with abusiveness, hatred of “the 
Other.” Insulting, even demonizing, rhetoric has been the rule on so-called 
“talk radio” for some time now, and of course it is also rampant on Internet 
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blogs. But it seems to me to be increasingly pervasive on television news 
channels as well, as has recently been publicly noted especially by Hispanic 
organizations. In this regard, Cable Network News in this country seems 
increasingly to be pandering to those viewers who prefer hearing heavy-
handed, often highly personal, attacks to genuine news. I say “in this 
country,” because the news programs of the same network that one is able to 
hear when traveling abroad, whether in Europe or in Asia or in Latin America, 
retain a much higher tone and offer much more information, as I have had 
considerable opportunity to observe in my travels in recent years. The 
judgment concerning the American people that this implies is obvious: 
namely, that we want spectres, so they should be given to us.   
The “defense,” if that is what it should be called, of those who 
provide such programs is that they are privately owned and should therefore 
be expected to make judgments in accordance with what they think is likely to 
accrue the greatest profit for their directors and chief shareholders. This point 
prompts my fourth proposal, which is that we must adopt new measures to 
regulate and restrain the practices of rampant capitalism, which are harming 
us in so many different ways. Far from being, as is often alleged, the 
economic system that is most compatible with democracy and freedom, 
capitalism often works in diametrical opposition to these things, as it seems 
to me any sober, clear-eyed analysis of our public life today – the enormous 
costs of elections and of health care, the terrible effects of unregulated sub-
prime mortgage lending, and on and on – must conclude. Indeed, what need 
to be put into question as well are certain fundamental illusions about liberal 
democracy itself, beginning with the illusion that, at least in the globalized 
world in which we live today, it is possible to promote democracy of a sort 
within the political life of a single country while simultaneously accepting the 
absence of democracy in most workplaces and the anti-immigrant ideologies 
that are called, in the title of one excellent book on the topic, Ideologies of 
Exclusion3 I should mention in passing that what the opponents of open 
borders most fear and decry, widespread unemployment of workers in more 
affluent countries, could be prevented by careful regulation of certain 
practices of current capitalist enterprise, such as the practice of simply pulling 
up stakes and moving elsewhere for the sake of the so-called “bottom line.” 
But these are matters for another paper at another time, too broad to deal 
with here today. 
As I hope it will be realized, these concluding, all-too-sketchy 
proposals of mine have been put forward as positive measures made 
possible by the exorcising of the false spectres that have been my principal 
focus of attention here. These are just a few proposals of many that I could 
make – and that, indeed, I think all of my readers could make as well; I have 
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had no desire to be esoteric here. They suggest, at least to my mind, a 
possible future of hope, hope that can be shared by secular and religious 
minds alike, since they seem to me to be in keeping with time-honored 
religious values, such as brotherhood and sisterhood, honesty, charity, and 
moderation, to which non-religious people of good will should also find it easy 
to subscribe. At the same time, I think that, although I would of course not 
expect unanimous agreement on all of my points, failure to change our ways 
along some such lines as I have sketched will eventually bring us and the 
whole of global humanity to confront what are probably the most formidable 
of future spectres that the Christian tradition has produced, the four horses 
and riders of the Apocalypse. They are war, famine, pestilence, and wild 
beasts – or in modern translation, nuclear war and, either in tandem or in 
sequence, the collapse of our ecosystem. By comparison with these, the 
spectre of Communism was a very friendly ghost indeed.   
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